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Abstract
In this paper, we study the signature codes for weighted binary adder channel (WbAC) and collusion-resistant
multimedia fingerprinting. LetA(n, t) denote the maximum cardinality of a t-signature code of length n, and A(n,w, t)
denote the maximum cardinality of a t-signature code of length n and constant weight w. First, we derive asymptotic
and general upper bounds of A(n, t) by relating signature codes to Bt codes and bipartite graphs with large girth
respectively, and also show the upper bounds are tight for certain cases. Second, we determine the exact values of
A(n, 2, 2) and A(n, 3, 2) for infinitely many n by connecting signature codes with C4-free graphs and union-free
families, respectively. Third, we provide two explicit constructions for t-signature codes which have efficient decoding
algorithms and applications to two-level signature codes. Furthermore, we show from the geometric viewpoint that
there does not exist any binary code with complete traceability for noisy WbAC and multimedia fingerprinting. A new
type of signature codes with a weaker requirement than complete traceability is introduced for the noisy scenario.
Index Terms
Signature code, weighted binary adder channel, multimedia fingerprinting
I. INTRODUCTION
The advancement of multimedia technologies with the development of communication networks has led to a
tremendous use of multimedia contents such as images, videos and so on. However, such an advantage also poses
the challenging task of resisting unauthorized redistribution of multimedia contents. Multimedia fingerprinting is a
technique to protect continuous copyrighted data [32], [36] and several types of anti-collusion codes for multimedia
fingerprinting have been investigated in recent decades, see [3], [7], [8], [17], [18], [25], [26] for example.
As in [32], [36], suppose that the multimedia content is represented as a real-valued vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈
R
m, called the host signal. To prevent unauthorized redistribution of x outside of M authorized users, the dealer
constructs a set of watermarks, also called fingerprints, using a linear modulation scheme based on n ≤ m noise-like
orthonormal signals F = {f i ∈ R
m : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. The set F is known to the dealer but unknown to all the users.
The fingerprint wj of the j-th user, 1 ≤ j ≤M , is represented as
wj =
n∑
i=1
cjif i,
where cji ∈ {−1, 1} for antipodal modulation and cji ∈ {0, 1} for on-off keying type of modulation [32]. In this
paper, we concentrate on the on-off keying type of modulation, that is, cji ∈ {0, 1}. Notice that there exists a
one-to-one correspondence between wj and cj = (cj1, cj2, . . . , cjn) ∈ {0, 1}n due to the linear independence of
{f i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Hence, designing a collection of fingerprints with desired properties is equivalent to designing a
set of binary n-dimensional vectors {cj : 1 ≤ j ≤M} ⊆ {0, 1}n with the corresponding properties.
In the above setting, the dealer distributes to the j-th authorized user the signal
yj = x+wj
under the assumption that ‖x‖ ≫ ‖wj‖1, which ensures that the embedded fingerprints do not make significant
changes to the host signal. A group of malicious users (coalition) may come together and create a forged copy
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1‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean norm.
2from their fingerprinted contents, but under the Multimedia Marking Assumption [18], they cannot manipulate the
orthonormal signals f i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In a linear attack, a coalition J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,M} creates a forged copy yˆ by
taking a linear combination of their copies yj with some real-valued coefficients λj , that is,
yˆ =
∑
j∈J
λjyj ,
where
∑
j∈J λj = 1, and λj > 0 for all j ∈ J since we consider that all users in the coalition make contributions
to the forged copy yˆ. Equivalently,
yˆ = x+
∑
j∈J
λjwj ,
where the coefficients λj are chosen by the coalition J but unknown to the dealer. When |J | = t and λj = 1/t for
all j ∈ J , the linear attack is known as the averaging attack. The interested reader is referred to [7], [8], [17], [26]
for more details.
To resist the collusion attack, once a forged copy yˆ is confiscated, the dealer aims to identify the coalition J
whose members created yˆ. First the dealer can calculate
r = (r1, . . . , rn) (1)
where
rk = 〈yˆ − x,fk〉 =
〈 n∑
i=1
∑
j∈J
λjcjif i,fk
〉
=
∑
j∈J
λjcjk (2)
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n and 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product. Based on the result r, the dealer would like to determine J
even though he/she does not know λj , j ∈ J , which thus requires that the set {cj : 1 ≤ j ≤M} has some desired
properties.
In [18], Egorova, Fernandez, Kabatiansky and Lee showed that designing {cj : 1 ≤ j ≤ M} which is able to
identify a coalition of size no more than t in multimedia fingerprinting is in fact equivalent to designing a t-signature
code in the weighted binary adder channel (WbAC). Suppose that M users would like to communicate with the
same destination through a shared WbAC in the multiple-access communication system, among which at most t users
are active simultaneously. To communicate successfully, each user j is encoded to a unique vector cj ∈ {0, 1}
n,
1 ≤ j ≤ M . If the users in J ⊆ [M ] are active at the same time, they input their vectors simultaneously into the
WbAC. The output in the destination is a vector r as in (1), where λj plays the role of weight depending only on
the channel but unknown to all encoders and the decoder. To identify J using the corresponding channel output r,
it is required to design {cj : 1 ≤ j ≤M} ⊆ {0, 1}n with some desired properties. The case that λj > 0, j ∈ J are
real numbers in WbAC was first investigated by Mathys [33]. In this paper, we consider the scenario that λj > 0,
j ∈ J are real numbers such that
∑
j∈J λj = 1, and then the WbAC is essentially a modification of the multimedia
fingerprinting channel. Due to the similarity of WbAC and multimedia fingerprinting, in the sequel, we will mainly
describe codes with respect to the multimedia fingerprinting channel for simplicity.
Let n,M and q be positive integers, and Q = {0, 1, . . . , q−1} be the alphabet. A set C = {c1, c2, . . . , cM} ⊆ Qn
is called a q-ary code of length n and cardinality M , or an (n,M, q) code, and each cj = (cj1, cj2, . . . , cjn) is
called a codeword. We also use an n ×M q-ary matrix to depict C in which each column is a codeword. Denote
[n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. For any I ⊆ [n], let C|I = {c|I : c ∈ C} be the punctured code of C on the positions in I .
An (n,M, 2) code is also called a binary code. Let C be a binary code. For any codeword c ∈ C, let supp(c) =
{i ∈ [n] : ci = 1} be the support of c. Denote 2[n] as the family of all subsets of [n], and
(
[n]
w
)
as the family of all
w-subsets of [n]. C has constant weight w if |supp(c)| = w for any c ∈ C.
Definition 1.1: Let C be an (n,M, 2) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer. C is an (n,M, 2) t-signature code if for any
subsets J,K ⊆ [M ] with 1 ≤ |J |, |K| ≤ t and for any real numbers λj , λ′k > 0 such that
∑
j∈J λj =
∑
k∈K λ
′
k = 1,∑
j∈J
λjcj =
∑
k∈K
λ′kck
implies that J = K .
In multimedia fingerprinting, an (n,M, 2) t-signature code C can trace back to any coalition of size no more than
t given a forged copy, and in the WbAC, it can identify any set of at most t active users from the channel output.
The decoding complexity is O(nM t) by checking the output r corresponding to which subset of C with size at
most t.
3Let A(n, t) denote the maximum cardinality of a t-signature code of length n, and A(n,w, t) denote the maximum
cardinality of a t-signature code of length n and constant weight w. In [18], Egorova, Fernandez, Kabatiansky and
Lee gave a construction for t-signature codes and obtained a lower bound of A(n, t).
Theorem 1.1: ([18])
A(n, t) ≥ 2⌊
n
t
⌋.
The lower bound of A(n, t) in Theorem 1.1 is not tight in general since for instance it shows A(3, 2) ≥ 2, while
the following example gives A(3, 2) ≥ 5.
Example 1: Let C be a binary code of length 3 defined as below.
C =
0 0 0 1 10 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0

It is easy to check that C is a 2-signature code, implying A(3, 2) ≥ 5.
To the best of our knowledge, the values of A(n, t) and A(n,w, t) are hitherto generally unknown except the
lower bound of A(n, t) in Theorem 1.1. The main purpose of this paper is to explore bounds for A(n, t) and
A(n,w, t) by using combinatorial methods, and to provide explicit constructions for t-signature codes which are
equipped with efficient decoding algorithms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first establish a relationship between t-
signature codes and Bt codes, obtaining asymptotic upper bounds for A(n, t). General upper bounds for A(n, t)
are given via graph theoretic approaches. In Section 3, we show that a 2-signature code of constant weight 2 is
equivalent to a corresponding C4-free graph, yielding asymptotic values of A(n, 2, 2). An upper bound for A(n, 3, 2)
is derived by investigating the extremal properties of 2-signature codes of constant weight 3. In Section 4, we provide
two explicit constructions for t-signature codes and also investigate their decoding algorithms and applications. In
Section 5, we show from the geometric viewpoint that there does not exist any binary code with complete traceability
for noisy multimedia fingerprinting, and introduce a new type of signature codes with a weaker requirement which
could be used in noisy multimedia fingerprinting. Conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
II. UPPER BOUNDS OF A(n, t)
In this section, we investigate upper bounds for A(n, t). First, we give an asymptotic upper bound for A(n, t)
by building a relationship between t-signature codes and Bt codes. Second, we derive a general upper bound for
A(n, t) by connecting a t-signature code with a bipartite graph containing no cycles of length less than or equal to
2t.
The concept of Bt codes was motivated by Bt-sequences introduced by Erdo¨s and Tura´n in [21]. Bt codes for
t = 2 were first studied by Lindstro¨m in [30] and later in [31] with the notion of Bt-sequences of vectors. In recent
decades, Bt codes were investigated due to their applications to multiple access adder channel, see [13]–[16] for
example.
Definition 2.1: Let C = {c1, . . . , cM} be an (n,M, q) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer. C is an (n,M, q) Bt code
if all sums
∑t
k=1 cik , 1 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 ≤ . . . ≤ it ≤M , are different.
We have the following relationship between t-signature codes and Bt codes.
Lemma 2.1: Let C be an (n,M, 2) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer. If C is a t-signature code, then C is a Bt code.
Moreover, C is a 2-signature code if and only if ci + cj 6= ck + cs for any distinct i, j, k, s ∈ [M ].
Proof: Let C = {c1, . . . , cM} be an (n,M, 2) code. Assume that C is a t-signature code, but not a Bt code. Then
there exist 1 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 ≤ . . . ≤ it ≤ M and 1 ≤ j1 ≤ j2 ≤ . . . ≤ jt ≤ M such that {i1, . . . , it} 6= {j1, . . . , jt}
but
∑t
k=1 cik =
∑t
l=1 cjl . Notice that {i1, . . . , it} and {j1, . . . , jt} might be multi-sets. If they are not multi-sets,
by simply taking λik = λjl = 1/t, we have
∑t
k=1 λikcik =
∑t
l=1 λjlcjl , a contradiction to that C is a t-signature
code. However, if they are multi-sets, we need to deal with it more carefully as follows.
Since
∑t
k=1 cik =
∑t
l=1 cjl , by subtracting all the common codewords counted in the two sums, we can obtain
two non-empty multi-subsets J,K with J ⊆ {i1, . . . , it}, K ⊆ {j1, . . . , jt}, |J | = |K| and J ∩K = ∅ such that∑
j∈J cj =
∑
k∈K ck. Without loss of generality, we may assume |J | = |K| = s with s ≤ t. Then we have∑
j∈J cj/s =
∑
k∈K ck/s. By combining the same terms in J and K , respectively, we can obtain two subsets
J ′,K ′ ⊆ [M ] with 1 ≤ |J ′|, |K ′| ≤ s and J ′∩K ′ = ∅ such that
∑
j∈J′ ajcj/s =
∑
k∈K′ bkck/s, where aj , j ∈ J
′
is the multiplicity of j in J and bk, k ∈ K ′ is the multiplicity of k in K . Let λj = aj/s, λ′k = bk/s for any j ∈ J
′
and k ∈ K ′. Then we have
∑
j∈J′ λjcj =
∑
k∈K′ λ
′
kck, where λj , λ
′
k > 0 and
∑
j∈J′ λj =
∑
k∈K′ λ
′
k = 1, a
contradiction to that C is a t-signature code. Hence we have that a t-signature code is a Bt code.
4When t = 2, it is enough to show the sufficiency. Assume that for any distinct i, j, k, s ∈ [M ], ci+cj 6= ck+cs, but
C is not a 2-signature code. Then according to Definition 1.1, there exist distinct J,K ⊆ [M ] with 1 ≤ |J |, |K| ≤ 2,
and also exist λj , λ
′
k > 0 such that
∑
j∈J λjcj =
∑
k∈K λ
′
kck where
∑
j∈J λj =
∑
k∈K λ
′
k = 1. We discuss the
following cases.
1) If |J | = 1 or |K| = 1, then we must have J = K , a contradiction to the assumption.
2) If |J | = |K| = 2 and J ∩K 6= ∅, then we can have J = K , a contradiction.
3) If |J | = |K| = 2 and J ∩K = ∅, without loss of generality, we may assume that J = {1, 2} and K = {3, 4}.
According to the assumption, there exist λ1, λ2, λ
′
3, λ
′
4 > 0 such that λ1c1 + λ2c2 = λ
′
3c3 + λ
′
4c4 where
λ1 + λ2 = λ
′
3 + λ
′
4 = 1. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we discuss the following three subcases of {c1i, c2i}.
3.a) If {c1i, c2i} = {0}, then λ1c1i + λ2c2i = 0 = λ′3c3i + λ
′
4c4i, which implies c3i = c4i = 0 since λ
′
3, λ
′
4 > 0.
3.b) If {c1i, c2i} = {1}, then λ1c1i +λ2c2i = 1 = λ′3c3i +λ
′
4c4i since λ1 +λ2 = 1, which implies c3i = c4i = 1
since λ′3, λ
′
4 > 0 and λ
′
3 + λ
′
4 = 1.
3.c) If {c1i, c2i} = {0, 1}, then 0 < λ1c1i + λ2c2i = λ′3c3i + λ
′
4c4i < 1, which implies {c3i, c4i} = {0, 1}.
So, we have c1 + c2 = c3 + c4, a contradiction to the assumption since {c1, c2} ∩ {c3, c4} = ∅.
The lemma follows.
A. Asymptotic upper bounds of A(n, t)
Denote B(n, t) as the maximum cardinality of a binary Bt code of length n. Define the largest asymptotic code
rates of t-signature codes and binary Bt codes as
R(t) = lim
n→∞
log2A(n, t)
n
,
RB(t) = lim
n→∞
log2B(n, t)
n
.
Denote Ht = −
∑t
k=0
(
t
k
)
2−t log2
((
t
k
)
2−t
)
and ht = log2(t+ 1) + t/(t+ 1). The best known results of RB(t)
are as follows.
Lemma 2.2: ([10], [13]–[16]) Let t ≥ 2 be an integer. Then
1) RB(2) ≤ 0.5753 and RB(4) ≤ 0.4451.
2) RB(2t− 1) ≤
{
(t/Ht + (t− 1)/ht)−1, 2 ≤ t ≤ 5,
H2t−1/(2t− 1), t ≥ 6.
3) RB(2t) ≤
{
(t/Ht + t/ht)
−1, 3 ≤ t ≤ 5,
H2t/(2t), t ≥ 6.
4) For sufficiently large t, RB(t) ≤ (log2 t+ log2(pie/2))/(2t) +O(1/t
3).
It is obvious from Lemma 2.1 that R(2) = RB(2) and R(t) ≤ RB(t) for t ≥ 3. Combining this with Lemma
2.2, we obtain
Theorem 2.1: Let t ≥ 2 be an integer. Then
1) R(2) ≤ 0.5753 and R(4) ≤ 0.4451.
2) R(2t− 1) ≤
{
(t/Ht + (t− 1)/ht)−1, 2 ≤ t ≤ 5,
H2t−1/(2t− 1), t ≥ 6.
3) R(2t) ≤
{
(t/Ht + t/ht)
−1, 3 ≤ t ≤ 5,
H2t/(2t), t ≥ 6.
4) For sufficiently large t, R(t) ≤ (log2 t+ log2(pie/2))/(2t) +O(1/t
3).
B. General upper bounds of A(n, t)
In the preceding subsection, we obtained an asymptotic upper bound of A(n, t) for any sufficiently large integer
n. In this subsection we show a general upper bound of A(n, t) for any positive integer n by relating a t-signature
code to a bipartite graph containing no cycles of length less than or equal to 2t.
Denote G = (V1, V2, E) as a bipartite graph where V1, V2 are two disjoint sets of vertices and E is the set of
edges each connecting one vertex in V1 and the other in V2. G = (V1, V2, E) is called complete if every vertex in
V1 is connected to every vertex in V2. A complete bipartite graph G = (V1, V2, E) with |V1| = m1 and |V2| = m2
is denoted as Km1,m2 . A cycle Ck of G = (V1, V2, E) is a sequence of vertices v1v2 · · · vkv1, where vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k
are all distinct and {vi, vi+1}, {vk, v1} ∈ E for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. The number of vertices in a cycle is called the
5length of this cycle, and the girth of a graph G is the length of the shortest cycle in G. If a graph G contains no
cycle of length k, it is called Ck-free. A matching of G is a subset of edges without common vertices, and a perfect
matching is a matching which matches all vertices in G.
Let C be an (n,M, 2) code. For a partition of [n] = I1 ∪ I2 with |I1| = n1, |I2| = n2 and n1 + n2 = n, we
define a bipartite graph corresponding to C as G = (V1, V2, E) such that V1 = {0, 1}n1, V2 = {0, 1}n2 and for any
u ∈ V1 and v ∈ V2, {u,v} ∈ E if and only if there exists a codeword c ∈ C such that c|I1 = u and c|I2 = v.
Denote e(G) as the number of edges in G. It is obvious that |V1| = 2n1 , |V2| = 2n2 and e(G) = |C|. Moreover, we
have the following observation.
Lemma 2.3: If C is a t-signature code, then for any partition of [n] = I1 ∪ I2, the girth of the corresponding
bipartite graph G = (V1, V2, E) is at least 2t+ 2.
Proof: To show G = (V1, V2, E) has girth at least 2t + 2, it suffices to show that G = (V1, V2, E) contains
no cycles of length 2k for any 2 ≤ k ≤ t. Assume that C is a t-signature code, but G = (V1, V2, E) contains
a cycle of length 2k for some 2 ≤ k ≤ t. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the cycle C2k is
v1v2 . . . v2k−1v2kv1. Let ei = {vi, vi+1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k− 1, and e2k = {v2k, v1}. Then {ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, i is odd}
and {ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, i is even} are two disjoint perfect matchings of the cycle C2k. Recall that each edge of
G corresponds to a codeword of C. Let ci ∈ C be the corresponding codeword of ei in C2k for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, and
C1 = {ci : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, i is odd}, C2 = {ci : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, i is even}. Then C1 and C2 are two disjoint subsets of
C such that |C1| = |C2| = k and
∑
c∈C1
c =
∑
c∈C2
c, a contradiction to Lemma 2.1 since C is a t-signature code.
The conclusion follows.
The following result was shown in [28] and [29].
Lemma 2.4: ([28], [29]) Let G = (V1, V2, E) be a bipartite graph with |V1| = u, |V2| = v and u ≥ v. If G
contains no cycles of length less than or equal to 2t, then
e(G) ≤
{
v
1
2 u
t+2
2t + c(u+ v), t is even,
(uv)
t+1
2t + c(u+ v), t is odd,
where c is a constant depending only on t.
Combining Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4, we have
Theorem 2.2: For any positive integers n and t,
A(n, t) ≤
{
2
1
2t 2
t+1
2t n + c2⌈
n
2 ⌉, t is even and n is odd,
2
t+1
2t n + c2⌈
n
2 ⌉, otherwise,
where c is a constant depending only on t.
Proof: Let C be an (n,M, 2) t-signature code with M = A(n, t). According to Lemma 2.3, for any partition
of [n] = I1 ∪ I2 with |I1| = n1, |I2| = n2 and n1 + n2 = n, the corresponding bipartite graph G = (V1, V2, E)
with |V1| = 2n1 , |V2| = 2n2 and e(G) = A(n, t) is C2k-free for any 2 ≤ k ≤ t. Suppose that n1 ≥ n2. By Lemma
2.4, we have
A(n, t) ≤ min
n1≥n2
n1+n2=n
{
2
n2
2 +
t+2
2t n1 + c′(2n1 + 2n2), t is even,
2
t+1
2t n + c′(2n1 + 2n2), t is odd,
where c′ is constant depending only on t.
If t is odd, then
A(n, t) ≤ min
n1≥n2
n1+n2=n
{
2
t+1
2t n + c′(2n1 + 2n2)
}
= 2
t+1
2t n + c′(2⌈
n
2 ⌉ + 2⌊
n
2 ⌋).
If t is even, then
A(n, t) ≤ min
n1≥n2
n1+n2=n
{
2
n2
2 +
t+2
2t n1 + c′(2n1 + 2n2)
}
=
{
2
1
2t 2
t+1
2t n + c′(2⌈
n
2 ⌉ + 2⌊
n
2 ⌋), n is odd,
2
t+1
2t n + (2c′)2
n
2 , n is even.
Let c = 2c′. Then c is a constant depending only on t and the proof is completed.
6C. Improved general upper bounds of A(n, 2)
In this subsection, we improve the upper bound of A(n, 2) in Theorem 2.2 via the Zarankiewicz number and
the techniques used in extremal set theory. The Zarankiewicz number z(m,m′; s, s′) is defined as the maximum
number of edges in a subgraph G of Km,m′ such that G does not contain Ks,s′ as a subgraph. When t = 2, we
consider the bipartite graph without C4, that is, the case of s = s
′ = 2. The known result for z(m,m′; 2, 2) can be
found in [34].
Lemma 2.5: ([34]) z(m,m′; 2, 2) ≤
(
m+ (m2 + 4mm′(m′ − 1))
1
2
)
/2 for any m,m′ ≥ 1.
Theorem 2.3: A(n, 2) ≤
(
2⌊
2n
3 ⌋ + (4⌊
2n
3 ⌋ + 2n+2(2⌈
n
3 ⌉ − 1))
1
2
)
/2 for any n ≥ 1.
Proof: Let C be a 2-signature code of length n and cardinality A(n, 2). By Lemma 2.3, for any partition of
[n] = I1 ∪ I2 with |I1| = n1, |I2| = n2 and n1 + n2 = n, the corresponding bipartite graph G of C is a C4-free
subgraph of K2n1 ,2n2 and e(G) = A(n, 2). Hence
A(n, 2) ≤ min
n1+n2=n
z(2n1 , 2n2 ; 2, 2)
≤
1
2
(
2⌊
2n
3 ⌋ + (4⌊
2n
3 ⌋ + 2n+2(2⌈
n
3 ⌉ − 1))
1
2
)
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2.5.
It is obvious that the upper bound of A(n, 2) in Theorem 2.3 is better than that in Theorem 2.2 for t = 2. In
what follows, we give another upper bound for A(n, 2) which could further improve Theorem 2.3 for certain values
of n. The idea comes from [3] in which Blackburn used the same method to derive an upper bound for separable
codes.
Theorem 2.4: A(n, 2) ≤ 2⌈
2n
3 ⌉ + 2⌊
n
3 ⌋(2⌊
n
3 ⌋ − 1)/2 for any n ≥ 1.
Proof: Let C be a 2-signature code of length n and cardinality A(n, 2). Let [n] = I1 ∪ I2 be a partition
of [n] with |I1| = ⌈2n/3⌉ = n1 and |I2| = ⌊n/3⌋ = n2. By Lemma 2.3, the corresponding bipartite graph
G = (V1, V2, E) of C is C4-free, where |V1| = 2n1 , |V2| = 2n2 and e(G) = A(n, 2). For any u ∈ V1, denote
N(u) = {v ∈ V2 : {u, v} ∈ E(G)} as the set of all neighbours of u. Then we have
A(n, 2) = e(G) =
∑
u∈V1
|N(u)|.
We claim that |N(u) ∩ N(u′)| ≤ 1 for any two distinct vertices u, u′ ∈ V1. If not, assume that there exist two
distinct vertices v, v′ ∈ V2 such that v ∈ N(u) ∩ N(u′) and v′ ∈ N(u) ∩ N(u′). Then uvu′v′u forms a cycle of
length 4 in G, which is a contradiction to Lemma 2.3.
The claim above shows that for any distinct u, u′ ∈ V1, N(u) ∩ N(u′) does not contain any subset of size 2.
Since each N(u) is a subset of V2 and contains
(
|N(u)|
2
)
subsets of size 2, we have∑
u∈V1
|N(u)|(|N(u)| − 1)/2 ≤ 2n2(2n2 − 1)/2.
The maximum value of the sum
∑
u∈V1
xu with xu being non-negative integers such that
∑
u∈V1
xu(xu−1)/2 ≤
2n2(2n2 − 1)/2 is achieved when xu = 2 for 2
n2(2n2 − 1)/2 vertices of u ∈ V1, and xu = 1 for the remaining
vertices. Hence
A(n, 2) =
∑
u∈V1
|N(u)|
≤ 2 (2n2(2n2 − 1)/2) + (2n1 − 2n2(2n2 − 1)/2)
= 2⌈
2n
3 ⌉ + 2⌊
n
3 ⌋(2⌊
n
3 ⌋ − 1)/2
and the theorem follows.
By Theorems 2.3 and 2.4, we obtain
Corollary 2.5: For any n ≥ 1,
A(n, 2) ≤
{ (
2⌊
2n
3 ⌋ + (4⌊
2n
3 ⌋ + 2n+2(2⌈
n
3 ⌉ − 1))
1
2
)
/2, n ≡ 2 (mod 3),
2⌈
2n
3 ⌉ + 2⌊
n
3 ⌋(2⌊
n
3 ⌋ − 1)/2, otherwise.
Corollary 2.6: A(2, 2) = 3, A(3, 2) = 5 and A(4, 2) = 7.
Proof: For n = 2, it is easy to check that C = {(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)} is a 2-signature code. Moreover, Corollary
2.5 shows that A(2, 2) ≤ 3, resulting A(2, 2) = 3. For n = 3, Corollary 2.5 shows that A(3, 2) ≤ 5 which, together
with Example 1, yields A(3, 2) = 5.
7TABLE I: The values of A(n, 2, 2) for 2 ≤ n ≤ 21
n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
A(n, 2, 2) 1 3 4 6 7 9 11 13 16 18
n 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
A(n, 2, 2) 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 46 50
For n = 4, we have that C = {(1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0), (1, 1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1), (1, 1, 1, 1)} is
a 2-signature code, implying A(4, 2) ≥ 7. Notice that Corollary 2.5 only tells that A(4, 2) ≤ 9. However, we
can improve Corollary 2.5 by showing A(4, 2) ≤ 7 whose proof is deferred to the appendix, and thus we have
A(4, 2) = 7.
Notice that from Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2.5, we have R(2) ≤ 2/3 and R(t) ≤ 1/2 + 1/(2t) for any t ≥ 3,
which is not as good as that obtained in Theorem 2.1. However, the bounds of A(n, t) in Theorem 2.2 and Corollary
2.5 are more general in the sense that they are valid for any positive integer n, while Theorem 2.1 is only valid for
sufficiently large integer n. Moreover, as shown in Corollary 2.6, our general upper bounds of A(n, t) are tight for
certain values of n and t.
III. BOUNDS OF A(n, 2, 2) AND A(n, 3, 2)
In this section, we study the combinatorial properties of 2-signature codes of length n and constant weights 2
and 3. Accordingly, the bounds of A(n, 2, 2) and A(n, 3, 2) are obtained.
A. Values of A(n, 2, 2)
Let C be a binary code of length n and constant weight 2. Let G = (V,E) be the corresponding graph of C
where V = [n] and for any distinct i, j ∈ [n], {i, j} ∈ E if and only if there exists a codeword c ∈ C such that
supp(c) = {i, j}. Then, we have the following observation.
Lemma 3.1: C is a 2-signature code of constant weight 2 if and only if its corresponding graph G is C4-free.
Proof: We first show the necessity. If there exist four vertices i, j, k, s ∈ [n] which form a cycle ijksi in graph
G, then there must exist four distinct codewords c1, c2, c3, c4 ∈ C such that supp(c1) = {i, j}, supp(c2) = {j, k},
supp(c3) = {k, s} and supp(c4) = {s, i}. It is easy to verify that c1 + c3 = c2 + c4, a contradiction to Lemma
2.1.
On the other hand, assume that the corresponding graph G of C is C4-free, but C is not a 2-signature code. By
Lemma 2.1, there must exist four distinct codewords ci, cj , ck, cs ∈ C such that ci + cj = ck + cs. If supp(ci) ∩
supp(cj) 6= ∅, then we have {ci, cj} = {ck, cs}, a contradiction to the assumption. Thus there must be four
elements in supp(ci) ∪ supp(cj) = supp(ck) ∪ supp(cs) which form a cycle of length 4 in G, a contradiction to
the assumption. The lemma follows.
Let g(n;C4) denote the maximum number of edges in a C4-free graph with n vertices. By Lemma 3.1, we have
A(n, 2, 2) = g(n;C4). It was proved in [4], [20] that g(n;C4) = (1/2+ o(1))n
3/2 for any sufficiently large integer
n, and in [23], [24] that g(n;C4) = m(m + 1)
2/2 for any integer n of the form n = m2 +m + 1 where m is a
power of 2, or a prime power greater than 13. In [9], the exact values of g(n;C4) for 2 ≤ n ≤ 21 were determined.
Now we have the following results for A(n, 2, 2).
Theorem 3.1: Let n ≥ 2 be an integer.
1) If n is sufficiently large, then A(n, 2, 2) = (1/2 + o(1))n3/2.
2) If n = m2 +m+ 1 where m is a power of 2 or m > 13 is a prime power, then A(n, 2, 2) = m(m+ 1)2/2.
3) For 2 ≤ n ≤ 21, the exact values of A(n, 2, 2) are listed in Table I.
B. An upper bound of A(n, 3, 2)
In this subsection, we investigate the extremal properties of 2-signature codes of constant weight 3 by means of
Frankl and Fu¨redi’s method in [22], where they studied binary codes using extremal set theory.
Let C be a binary code of length n and constant weight 3. Notice that C can be uniquely described as a family
F ⊆
(
[n]
3
)
where F = {supp(c) : c ∈ C}. For any A ∈
(
[n]
2
)
, denote
T (A) = {z ∈ [n] : A ∪ {z} ∈ F}. (3)
8Then, we have the following observation.
Lemma 3.2: C is a 2-signature code of constant weight 3 if and only if |T (A) ∩ T (A′)| ≤ 1 for any distinct
A,A′ ∈
(
[n]
2
)
.
Proof: To show the necessity, assume that there exist distinct A,A′ ∈
(
[n]
2
)
and also distinct elements z, z′ ∈ [n]
such that {z, z′} ⊆ T (A) ∩ T (A′). Then A ∪ {z}, A ∪ {z′}, A′ ∪ {z}, A′ ∪ {z′} are four distinct members of F .
Suppose that their corresponding codewords in C are c1, c2, c3, c4, respectively. Then we have c1 + c4 = c2 + c3,
a contradiction to Lemma 2.1.
Next, we show the sufficiency. Assume that C satisfies that |T (A) ∩ T (A′)| ≤ 1 for any distinct A,A′ ∈
(
[n]
2
)
,
but is not a 2-signature code. Then according to Lemma 2.1, there exist distinct codewords ci, cj , ck, cs ∈ C such
that ci + cj = ck + cs. Let Bm = supp(cm), m ∈ {i, j, k, s} which are four distinct members of F . Suppose
that Bi = {a, b, c} and Bj = {x, y, z}. If |Bi ∩ Bj | = 2, then we must have {Bi, Bj} = {Bk, Bs} which implies
{ci, cj} = {ck, cs}, a contradiction to the assumption. So, we have |Bi ∩ Bj | ≤ 1. Now we discuss the following
two cases.
1) If |Bi∩Bj | = 1, assume that c = x. Then, c ∈ Bk∩Bs. Recall that ci+cj = ck+cs and {Bi, Bj}∩{Bk, Bs} =
∅. Thus one of a and b should be in Bk and the other in Bs, and so as y and z. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that Bk = {a, y, c} and Bs = {b, z, c}. Let A = {a, c} and A′ = {z, c}. Then {b, y} ∈
(
T (A)
2
)
∩
(
T (A′)
2
)
,
a contradiction to that |T (A) ∩ T (A′)| ≤ 1.
2) If |Bi ∩ Bj | = 0, then Bk ∩ Bs = ∅. Without loss of generality, we may assume that Bk = {a, b, x} and
Bs = {c, y, z}. Let A = {a, b} and A′ = {y, z}. Then, {c, x} ∈
(
T (A)
2
)
∩
(
T (A′)
2
)
, also a contradiction.
The conclusion then follows.
Based on Lemma 3.2, we shall derive an upper bound for A(n, 3, 2) which is the same as an upper bound
for weakly union-free families given by Frankl and Fu¨redi [22]. However, the bound cannot be obtained directly
from the relationship between signature codes and weakly union-free families, which will be shown in Lemma 3.3
afterwards.
Theorem 3.2: A(n, 3, 2) ≤ n(n− 1)/3 for any n ≥ 3.
Proof: Let C be an (n,M, 2) 2-signature code of constant weight 3 with M = A(n, 3, 2). According to (3),
we have
3A(n, 3, 2) =
∑
A∈([n]2 )
|T (A)| (4)
since each 3-elements set has 3 subsets of size 2 and each codeword in C is calculated three times in the right-hand
side of (4). Besides, Lemma 3.2 tells that
(
T (A)
2
)
∩
(
T (A′)
2
)
= ∅ for any distinct A,A′ ∈
(
[n]
2
)
, implying∑
A∈([n]2 )
(
|T (A)|
2
)
≤
(
n
2
)
. (5)
Note that the maximum value of
∑
A∈([n]2 )
|T (A)| under the condition (5) is achieved when |T (A)| = 2 for all
A ∈
(
[n]
2
)
. Hence by (4),
A(n, 3, 2) ≤ 2
(
n
2
)/
3
= n(n− 1)/3
and the theorem follows.
Next, we show that the upper bound of A(n, 3, 2) in Theorem 3.2 can be achieved for all values of n with
some exceptions by establishing the relationship between signature codes and weakly union-free families. A family
F ⊆ 2[n] is called weakly union-free if for any distinct A,B,C,D ∈ F , A ∪B 6= C ∪D.
Lemma 3.3: Let C be a binary code of length n and F ⊆ 2[n] be the corresponding family. If F is weakly
union-free, then C is a 2-signature code.
Proof: Assume that F is weakly union-free, but C is not a 2-signature code. By Lemma 2.1, there exist
distinct codewords ci, cj , ck, cs ∈ C such that ci + cj = ck + cs. This implies that supp(ci) ∪ supp(cj) =
supp(ck) ∪ supp(cl), a contradiction to the assumption. Then the lemma follows.
We remark that the converse of Lemma 3.3 does not hold. That is, if C is a 2-signature code, the corresponding
family F may not be weakly union-free. The following is an example.
9Example 2: Let C be a binary code of length 5 and constant weight 3 defined as below.
C =

1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1

Its corresponding family is F = {{1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 4, 5}}. It is easy to check that C is a 2-signature
code, but F is not weakly union-free since {1, 2, 3} ∪ {3, 4, 5} = {1, 3, 4} ∪ {2, 4, 5}.
Denote F3(n) as the maximum cardinality of a weakly union-free family F ⊆
(
[n]
3
)
. Then by Lemma 3.3,
we have A(n, 3, 2) ≥ F3(n). It was proved in [6], [11] that F3(n) ≥ n(n − 1)/3 for any n ≥ 24 and n ∈
{13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21}. Combining this with Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 3.3, we have
Theorem 3.3: A(n, 3, 2) = n(n− 1)/3 for any n ≥ 24 and n ∈ {13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21}.
IV. CONSTRUCTIONS FOR t-SIGNATURE CODES
In this section, we provide two explicit constructions for signature codes, one is based on concatenation and
the other on the Kronecker product. We prove that the signature codes obtained from these two constructions have
efficient decoding algorithms and large code sizes. Moreover, we propose the concept of two-level signature codes,
and show that the product construction could be applied to construct two-level signature codes.
We first recap several classes of combinatorial codes which will be exploited later. Frameproof codes were
introduced by Boneh and Shaw [5] aiming to protect innocent users from being framed by any other t colluders but
were shown to have no traceability in digital fingerprinting, see [35] for example. Later Cheng and Miao [8] proved
that, in fact, frameproof codes have an excellent traceability in a discretized model of multimedia fingerprinting.
Superimposed codes were proposed by Kautz and Singleton [27] for retrieving files, and later also extensively
investigated in the contexts of disjunct matrices and cover-free families, see [12], [19] for example.
Let C be an (n,M, q) code. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, denote C(i) = {ci : c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ C} as the set of i-th
coordinates of C. The descendant code of C is defined as
desc(C) = C(1)× C(2)× · · · × C(n) ⊆ Qn.
Definition 4.1: Let t ≥ 2 be an integer.
1) C is an (n,M, q) t-frameproof code, or an (n,M, q) t-FPC, if for any subset C0 ⊆ C with 1 ≤ |C0| ≤ t, we
have desc(C0) ∩ C = C0.
2) C is an (n,M, 2) t-superimposed code, if for any subset C0 ⊆ C with 1 ≤ |C0| ≤ t and any other codeword
c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ C \ C0, there exists 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that ck = 1 and C0(k) = {0}.
A. Concatenated construction
We now give the concatenated construction by taking small signature codes as the inner codes and frameproof
codes as the outer codes which is described as follows.
Construction 1: Let A be an (n1,M1, q) t-FPC over the alphabet Q and B be an (n2, q, 2) t-signature code.
Define a bijection φ : Q→ B. Let C be the code defined by
Φ : A → C
a = (a1, . . . , an1) 7→ Φ(a) = (φ(a1), . . . , φ(an1)).
Then C is an (n1n2,M1, 2) t-signature code.
Proof: It is obvious that C is an (n1n2,M1, 2) code. For any distinct C1, C2 ⊆ C with 1 ≤ |C1|, |C2| ≤ t, and
for any real numbers λj , λ
′
k > 0 such that
∑
cj∈C1
λj =
∑
ck∈C2
λ′k = 1, we would like to show∑
cj∈C1
λjcj 6=
∑
ck∈C2
λ′kck. (6)
Since C1 6= C2, without loss of generality, we may assume that there exists one codeword c such that c ∈ C1 \ C2.
Suppose that C1, C2 correspond to A1,A2 ⊆ A respectively, and c corresponds to a = (a1, . . . , an1) ∈ A. Clearly,
|A1| ≤ t, |A2| ≤ t and a ∈ A1 \A2. Since A is an (n1,M1, q) t-FPC, there must exist one coordinate i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n1
10
such that ai 6∈ A2(i). This implies that A1(i) 6= A2(i). Let Ii = [(i − 1)n2 + 1, in2]. Then {cj |Ii : cj ∈ C1} 6=
{ck|Ii : ck ∈ C2}. Since the inner code B is a t-signature code, we have∑
cj∈C1
λjcj |Ii 6=
∑
ck∈C2
λ′kck|Ii
for any real numbers λj , λ
′
k > 0 such that
∑
cj∈C1
λj =
∑
ck∈C2
λ′k = 1, which implies (6). Hence C is a t-signature
code.
The concatenated signature codes are decoded in two steps, that is, first decoding the inner code and then decoding
the outer code.
Theorem 4.1: The concatenated signature code C obtained by Construction 1 can trace back to a coalition of size
at most t in time O(n1n2q
t + tn1M1).
Proof: Suppose that r = (r1, r2, . . . , rn1) is an output of multimedia fingerprinting channel where ri =
(ri1, . . . , rin2) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n1. Suppose that X ⊆ C, |X | ≤ t is the real coalition for the output r. To determine
X by r and the code C, we divide the decoding process into the following two steps.
Step 1. First we decode the inner code. For each ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ n1, a subset Bi ⊆ B, |Bi| = si ≤ t can be traced
back since the inner code B is a t-signature code. Denote Qi = {φ−1(b) : b ∈ Bi} ⊆ Q, 1 ≤ i ≤ n1. The time cost
in this step is O(n1n2q
t).
Step 2. Next we decode the outer code. For the outer code A, detect each codeword a = (a1, . . . , an1) ∈ A by
checking if ai ∈ Qi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n1. If so, then the user corresponding to the codeword Φ(a) ∈ C is identified
as a colluder. Denote X̂ = {Φ(a) ∈ C : a ∈ A, ai ∈ Qi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n1}. The time cost in this step is O(n1M1).
Now we show that X will be identified after Steps 1 and 2. To this end, we show that X = X̂ . By Step 1, we
have X ⊆ X̂ . Assume that there exists c0 ∈ X̂ \X . Then, by Step 2, we have Φ−1(c0) ∈ desc({Φ−1(c) : c ∈ X}),
a contradiction to the condition that A is a t-FPC. Hence we have X = X̂ .
Based on Steps 1 and 2, the concatenated signature code C can trace back to a coalition of size at most t in time
O(n1n2q
t + n1M1).
The decoding complexity of an (n1n2,M1, 2) t-signature code is O(n1n2M
t
1). According to Theorem 4.1, the
(n1n2,M1, 2) t-signature code obtained by Construction 1 could reduce the decoding complexity to O(n1n2q
t +
n1M1) if we choose an (n1,M1, q) t-FPC with q < M1 as the outer code. This can be achieved due to the known
results on t-FPCs, see [2] for example.
B. Product construction
Now we provide a product construction by combining superimposed codes and signature codes as follows.
Construction 2: Let A be an (n1,M1, 2) t-superimposed code, and B be an (n2,M2, 2) t-signature code and
0 ∈ B. Denote B∗ = B \ {0}. Let C = A⊗ B∗, where A⊗ B∗ is the Kronecker product of A and B∗:
A⊗ B∗ =

a11B∗ a21B∗ · · · aM11B
∗
a12B∗ a22B∗ · · · aM12B
∗
...
...
...
a1n1B
∗ a2n1B
∗ · · · aM1n1B
∗
 .
Then C is an (n1n2,M1(M2 − 1), 2) t-signature code.
Proof: It is obvious that B∗ is an (n2,M2 − 1, 2) code, and thus C is an (n1n2,M1(M2 − 1), 2) code. For
simplicity, we use group notation
C =
[
G1 G2 · · · GM1
]
(7)
where for each group Gh, 1 ≤ h ≤M1,
Gh =

ah1B∗
ah2B
∗
...
ahn1B
∗
 .
For any two distinct subsets C1, C2 ⊆ C such that |C1| ≤ t and |C2| ≤ t, denote G1 = {h ∈ [M1] : C1 ∩ Gh 6= ∅}
and G2 = {h ∈ [M1] : C2 ∩ Gh 6= ∅}. Obviously, |G1| ≤ t and |G2| ≤ t. We would like to show that for any real
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numbers λj , λ
′
k > 0 such that
∑
cj∈C1
λj =
∑
ck∈C2
λ′k = 1, we have∑
cj∈C1
λjcj 6=
∑
ck∈C2
λ′kck. (8)
To this end, we consider the following two cases.
1) G1 = G2 and |G1| = |G2| = s, 1 ≤ s ≤ t.
1.a) If s = 1, without loss of generality, we may assume G1 = G2 = {1}. Then, C1, C2 ⊆ G1. Since A
is an (n1,M1, 2) t-superimposed code, A does not have 0 as a column vector. Then there must exist i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n1 such that a1i = 1. Denote Ii = [(i − 1)n2 + 1, in2], 1 ≤ i ≤ n1. Recall that C1 6= C2. Then
{cj |Ii : cj ∈ C1} 6= {ck|Ii : ck ∈ C2}. Since B
∗ is a t-signature code, we have∑
cj∈C1
λjcj |Ii 6=
∑
ck∈C2
λ′kck|Ii
for any real numbers λj , λ
′
k > 0 such that
∑
cj∈C1
λj =
∑
ck∈C2
λ′k = 1, implying (8).
1.b) If 2 ≤ s ≤ t, without loss of generality, we may assume G1 = G2 = {1, . . . , s}. Then, |C1∩Gh| ≤ t− 1 and
|C2∩Gh| ≤ t−1 for any h ∈ G1. Since C1 6= C2, there exists at least one h ∈ G1 such that C1∩Gh 6= C2∩Gh.
Without loss of generality, we may assume C1 ∩ G1 6= C2 ∩ G1. Since A is a t-superimposed code, there
exists i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 such that a1i = 1 and ahi = 0 for any 2 ≤ h ≤ s. Clearly, c|Ii = 0 for any c ∈ Gh,
2 ≤ h ≤ s. Since B = B∗ ∪ {0} is a t-signature code, we have∑
cj∈C1∩G1
λjcj |Ii + λ0 6=
∑
ck∈C2∩G1
λ′kck|Ii + λ
′
0
for any real numbers λj , λ, λ
′
k, λ
′ > 0 such that
∑
cj∈C1∩G1
λj +λ =
∑
ck∈C2∩G1
λ′k + λ
′ = 1. This implies
that ∑
cj∈C1∩G1
λjcj +
s∑
h=2
∑
cm∈C1∩Gh
λmcm 6=
∑
ck∈C2∩G1
λ′kck +
s∑
h=2
∑
cr∈C2∩Gh
λ′rcr
for any real numbers λj , λm, λ
′
k, λ
′
r > 0 such that
∑
cj∈C1∩G1
λj+
∑s
h=2
∑
cm∈C1∩Gh
λm =
∑
ck∈C2∩G1
λ′k+∑s
h=2
∑
cr∈C2∩Gh
λ′r = 1, which further implies (8).
2) G1 6= G2. Without loss of generality, we may assume G1 \ G2 6= ∅ and h ∈ G1 \ G2. Since A is a t-
superimposed code, there exists i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 such that ahi = 1 and ah′i = 0 for all h
′ ∈ G2. By the
construction of C and the fact that B∗ = B \ {0}, C1|Ii contains at least one nonzero vector and C2|Ii = {0},
which implies that
∑
cj∈C1
λjcj |Ii 6= 0 and
∑
ck∈C2
λ′kck|Ii = 0 for any real numbers λj , λ
′
k > 0 such that∑
cj∈C1
λj =
∑
ck∈C2
λ′k = 1. Then (8) follows.
Hence C is a t-signature code.
Next we turn to the decoding process of the signature code obtained from Construction 2, which consists of two
steps: first decoding the outer code and then decoding the inner code. Notice that this is the converse order of the
decoding in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.2: The signature code C obtained by Construction 2 can trace back to a coalition of size at most t in
time O(tn2M
t
2 + n1n2M1).
Proof: Suppose that r = (r1, . . . , rn1) is an output of the multimedia fingerprinting channel where ri =
(ri1, . . . , rin2) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n1. Suppose that X ⊆ C, |X | ≤ t is the real coalition for the output r. Denote
G = {h ∈ [M1] : X ∩Gh 6= ∅} as the set of group indices of the codewords in X . Obviously, |G| ≤ t. To determine
X by r and the code C, we will first determine G, and then determine X ∩ Gh for any h ∈ G.
Step 1. For the outer code A, detect each codeword (ah1, . . . , ahn1) ∈ A, 1 ≤ h ≤ M1 by checking if there
exists i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 such that ri = 0 and ahi = 1. Denote G0 = {h ∈ [M1] : ri = 0 and ahi = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n1} and
Ĝ = [M1] \G0. We claim that G = Ĝ. The time cost in this step is O(n1n2M1).
To verify our claim, we first show G ⊆ Ĝ. Assume that there exists h ∈ G but h 6∈ Ĝ, that is, h ∈ G0. Then
there exists i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 such that ri = 0 and ahi = 1. Notice that ri = 0 implies X|Ii = {0}. Then we have
X ∩ Gh = ∅, that is, h 6∈ G, a contradiction to the assumption. So we have G ⊆ Ĝ. On the other hand, we show
Ĝ ⊆ G. Assume that there exists h′ ∈ Ĝ but h′ 6∈ G. Since A is a t-superimposed code, there exists i′, 1 ≤ i′ ≤ n1
such that ah′i′ = 1 and ahi′ = 0 for any h ∈ G. Recall that G is the set of group indices of the codewords in X .
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Thus we have X|Ii′ = {0} which implies ri′ = 0. Then we have h
′ ∈ G0, a contradiction to the assumption that
h′ ∈ Ĝ since Ĝ ∩G0 = ∅. So, we have G = Ĝ and thus G can be determined after Step 1.
Step 2. In this step, we show how to determine X ∩ Gh for any h ∈ G.
1) If |G| = 1, without loss of generality, we may assume G = {1}. Then, X = X∩G1. Since A is a t-superimposed
code, there exists i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 such that a1i = 1. Then we have ri 6= 0. Since B∗ is a t-signature code, we
can determine X|Ii by ri, and thus can determine X . The time cost in this case is O(n2(M2 − 1)
t + n1).
2) If |G| = s ≥ 2, then we have 2 ≤
∑
h∈G |X ∩ Gh| ≤ t, and 1 ≤ |X ∩ Gh| ≤ t − 1 for any h ∈ G. Since A
is a t-superimposed code, for any h ∈ G, there exists i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 such that ahi = 1 and ah′i = 0 for any
h′ ∈ G \ {h}. Then we have (X \ Gh)|Ii = {0}. Since B = B
∗ ∪ {0} is a t-signature code, we can determine
(X ∩Gh)|Ii by ri, and thus can determine X ∩Gh for any h ∈ G. The time cost in this case is O(tn2M
t
2+tn1).
Based on Steps 1 and 2, the t-signature code obtained by Construction 2 can trace back to all the colluders of
size no more than t in time O(tn2M
t
2 + n1n2M1 + tn1).
In general, the decoding complexity of an (n1n2,M1(M2 − 1), 2) t-signature code is O(n1n2M t1(M2 − 1)
t).
Here according to Theorem 4.2, we can reduce the decoding complexity to O(tn2M
t
2 + n1n2M1 + tn1) by using
the t-signature code obtained from Construction 2.
C. Two-level signature codes
In this subsection, we show that Construction 2 can also be applied to construct two-level signature codes. Two-
level codes were introduced by Anthapadmanabhan and Barg [1] in digital fingerprinting with the feature that all the
codewords are classified into groups and each group consists of several codewords. They showed that a two-level
(t1, t2)-fingerprinting code, where t1 > t2, could identify all the colluders in digital fingerprinting if the coalition
size is no more than t2, and determine all the groups containing at least one colluder if the coalition size is no more
than t1. Inspired by this, we introduce the concept of two-level signature codes for multimedia fingerprinting.
Definition 4.2: Let C be an (n,M, 2) code and t1, t2 be positive integers with t1 > t2. Suppose that all the
codewords of C are partitioned into M1(< M) groups: C = G1 ∪ G2 ∪ . . . ∪ GM1 . For any subset C
′ ⊆ C, denote
G(C′) = {h ∈ [M1] : C′ ∩ Gh 6= ∅} as the set of group indices of the codewords in C′. C is an (n,M, 2) two-
level (t1, t2)-signature code if for any J,K ⊆ [M ] and for any real numbers λj , λ′k > 0 such that
∑
j∈J λj =∑
k∈K λ
′
k = 1, ∑
j∈J
λjcj =
∑
k∈K
λ′kck
implies that
1) J = K if 1 ≤ |J |, |K| ≤ t2;
2) G({cj ∈ C : j ∈ J}) = G({ck ∈ C : k ∈ K}) if 1 ≤ |J |, |K| ≤ t1.
By Definition 4.2, in multimedia fingerprinting, a two-level (t1, t2)-signature code could
a) trace back to all the colluders if the coalition size is at most t2;
b) determine all the groups each of which contains at least one colluder if the coalition size is at most t1.
By Definitions 1.1 and 4.2, we have the relationship between signature codes (one-level) and two-level signature
codes as follows.
Proposition 4.1: A t1-signature code is a two-level (t1, t2)-signature code, and a two-level (t1, t2)-signature code
is a t2-signature code.
The following construction for two-level signature codes is an application of Construction 2.
Theorem 4.3: Let t1, t2 be two positive integers such that t1 > t2. Let A be an (n1,M1, 2) t1-superimposed
code and B be an (n2,M2, 2) t2-signature code containing 0. Then there exists an (n1n2,M1(M2−1), 2) two-level
(t1, t2)-signature code with M1 groups.
Proof: By Construction 2, an (n1n2,M1(M2 − 1), 2) code C can be obtained from A and B. Now we show
that C is a two-level (t1, t2)-signature code. It is obvious that all the codewords of C are divided into M1 groups
and each group contains M2 − 1 codewords. If a forged copy is created by a coalition of size at most t2, all the
colluders will be identified by Theorem 4.2. If a forged copy is created by a coalition of size at most t1, by Step 1 of
the decoding process in the argument of Theorem 4.2, any group containing at least one colluder will be identified.
The proof is completed.
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Fig. 1: 3-dimensional hypercube
V. COMMENTS ON NOISY WEIGHTED BINARY ADDER CHANNEL AND MULTIMEDIA FINGERPRINTING
In the previous sections, we investigated signature codes for noiseless multimedia fingerprinting channel. In this
section, we consider the noisy scenario, and show from the the geometric viewpoint that there does not exist any
binary code with complete traceability for noisy multimedia fingerprinting channel.
A. Geometric description of signature codes
Let {0, 1}n be the vertex-set of the n-dimensional hypercube. For any subset S = {c1, c2, . . . , cs} ⊆ {0, 1}n,
define the open convex polytope of S as
P(S) =
{ s∑
i=1
λici :
s∑
i=1
λi = 1 and λi > 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ s
}
. (9)
For any distinct S1, S2 ⊆ {0, 1}n, the open convex polytopes of S1 and S2 do not cross if
P(S1) ∩ P(S2) = ∅.
The following observation is immediate according to Definition 1.1.
Proposition 5.1: C is an (n,M, 2) t-signature code if and only if for any distinct C1, C2 ⊆ C with 1 ≤ |C1|, |C2| ≤ t,
we have P(C1) ∩ P(C2) = ∅.
Example 3: Consider the vertices of the 3-dimensional hypercube as shown in Figure 1. The open convex polytope
of any two distinct vertices vi, vj is the line segment between vi and vj except vi, vj themselves. Let H0 =
{v1, v2, v3, v6, v8}. It is easy to check that the open convex polytopes of any two vertices in H0 do not cross. The
corresponding set of vectors of H0, that is, C = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0)} is a 2-signature code
as described in Example 1.
B. Noisy multimedia fingerprinting
In practice, the noisy multimedia fingerprinting channel is more realistic but with more complicate assumptions
than the noiseless case. That is, the dealer observes the forged copy with some noise which may be produced
artificially by the coalition before redistributing the forged copy, or generated unartificially during the redistribution
process of the forged copy. We show from the geometric viewpoint that no coalition could be completely traced
back in noisy multimedia fingerprinting.
Assume that the colluders in a coalition J add some noise ε for the purpose of making themselves less likely to
be identified, where ε = (ε1, . . . , εm) ∈ Rm \ {0} such that ‖ε‖ < δ and δ is very small. Then the dealer observes
the forged copy
y˜ = x+
∑
j∈J
λjwj + ε. (10)
Notice that ε is chosen by the coalition J and unknown to the dealer. However, the dealer can calculate
r˜k = 〈y˜ − x,fk〉 (11)
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and obtain
r˜ = (r˜1, . . . , r˜n) =
∑
j∈J
λjcj + e (12)
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where e = (e1, . . . , en) ∈ Rn and ek = 〈ε,fk〉 for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. It should be noted that the dealer does not know
what e is, but knows that ‖e‖ ≤ ‖ε‖.
In noisy multimedia fingerprinting, the dealer would also like to design a binary code C with some properties to
identify the whole coalition set J based on the result r˜ calculated in (12). We define the complete traceability of a
binary code for noisy multimedia fingerprinting as follows.
Definition 5.1: Let C be an (n,M, 2) code, t ≥ 2 be an integer and δ > 0 be a real number. C has (t, δ)-complete
traceability if for any J,K ⊆ [M ] with 1 ≤ |J |, |K| ≤ t, and for any e, e′ ∈ Rn with ‖e‖, ‖e′‖ < δ,∑
j∈J
λjcj + e =
∑
k∈K
λ′kck + e
′
implies that J = K , where λj , λ
′
k > 0 are any real numbers such that
∑
j∈J λj =
∑
k∈K λ
′
k = 1.
For any distinct S1, S2 ⊆ Rn, define the distance between S1 and S2 as
d(S1, S2) = inf{‖z − z
′‖ : z ∈ S1, z
′ ∈ S2}. (13)
Note that if S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅, then d(S1, S2) = 0. We have the following observation.
Proposition 5.2: An (n,M, 2) code C has (t, δ)-complete traceability if and only if for any distinct C1, C2 ⊆ C
with 1 ≤ |C1|, |C2| ≤ t, we have
d(P(C1),P(C2)) ≥ 2δ. (14)
Proof: Suppose that J,K are two distinct subsets of [M ] with 1 ≤ |J |, |K| ≤ t, and λj , λ′k are positive real
numbers such that
∑
j∈J λj =
∑
k∈K λ
′
k = 1. Then,
∑
j∈J λjcj + e 6=
∑
k∈K λ
′
kck + e
′ holds for any e, e′ ∈ Rn
with ‖e‖, ‖e′‖ < δ if and only if ‖
∑
j∈J λjcj−
∑
k∈K λ
′
kck‖ ≥ 2δ. Let C1 = {cj : j ∈ J} and C2 = {ck : k ∈ K}.
Obviously, C1, C2 ⊆ C with 1 ≤ |C1|, |C2| ≤ t and C1 6= C2. Notice that
∑
j∈J λjcj is a point located in P(C1)
and
∑
k∈K λ
′
kck is a point located in P(C2). Then by Definition 5.1 and (13), we can obtain (14). The conclusion
follows.
According to Proposition 5.2, in noisy multimedia fingerprinting, a coalition with size no more than t can be
traced back if and only if there exists a binary code C such that for any distinct C1, C2 ⊆ C with |C1|, |C2| ≤ t, (14)
is satisfied. However, if C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅, according to (9) and (13), we always have d(P(C1),P(C2)) = 0, and thus
(14) does not hold. This immediately implies
Proposition 5.3: There does not exist any binary code with complete traceability in noisy multimedia fingerprinting.
Although there exists no binary code that can trace back to all the colluders in noisy multimedia fingerprinting,
we can design a binary code with a weaker requirement than Definition 5.1 to provide some security. Stinson, Trung
and Wei [35] introduced secure frameproof codes in digital fingerprinting to make sure that any illegal copy cannot
be generated simultaneously by two disjoint coalition sets. Inspired by this, we introduce frameproof signature codes
for noisy multimedia fingerprinting.
Definition 5.2: Let C be an (n,M, 2) code, t ≥ 2 be an integer and δ > 0 be a real number. C is an (n,M, 2)
(t, δ)-frameproof signature code if for any J,K ⊆ [M ] with 1 ≤ |J |, |K| ≤ t and J∩K = ∅, and for any e, e′ ∈ Rn
with ‖e‖, ‖e′‖ < δ, ∑
j∈J
λjcj + e =
∑
k∈K
λ′kck + e
′
implies that J = K , where λj , λ
′
k > 0 are any real numbers such that
∑
j∈J λj =
∑
k∈K λ
′
k = 1.
We provide an equivalent description of frameproof signature codes from the geometric viewpoint.
Proposition 5.4: C is an (n,M, 2) (t, δ)-frameproof signature code if and only if for any C1, C2 ⊆ C with
1 ≤ |C1|, |C2| ≤ t and C1 ∩ C2 = ∅, we have d(P(C1),P(C2)) ≥ 2δ.
Example 4: It is easy to see from Example 3 that C = {(0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} is a (2, 1/2)-
frameproof signature code.
We remark that although a (t, δ)-frameproof signature code C cannot identify any coalition set in noisy multimedia
fingerprinting, it can guarantee at least two things:
1) If C1 ⊆ C is a coalition of size at most t, then C1 cannot frame any C2 ⊆ C with |C2| ≤ t and C1 ∩ C2 = ∅
since they cannot create the same forged copy y˜.
2) If C1 ⊆ C is a coalition of size at most t and r˜ is the corresponding output of noisy multimedia fingerprinting
channel, then any C2 ⊆ C with |C2| ≤ t and d({r˜},P(C2)) < δ contains at least one colluder.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated signature codes for weighted binary adder channel and collusion-resistant multimedia
fingerprinting. We showed the relationships between signature codes and other known combinatorial structures
and obtained general and asymptotic upper bounds of t-signature codes. We explored the extremal properties and
derived bounds for 2-signature codes of constant weights 2 and 3, respectively. Moreover, we provided two explicit
constructions for t-signature codes which have efficient tracing algorithms. We also introduced two-level signature
codes and gave an explicit construction for two-level signature codes. At last, we considered signature codes from
geometric perspectives, and showed that there does not exist any binary code with complete traceability for noisy
multimedia fingerprinting. We also introduced a new type of signature codes for noisy multimedia fingerprinting.
It would be of interest to further improve the bounds for signature codes shown in this paper and find more
explicit constructions for signature codes. It would also be of interest to investigate the new type of signature codes
introduced in this paper for noisy multimedia fingerprinting.
APPENDIX
The proof of A(4, 2) ≤ 7: Assume that C ⊆ {0, 1}4 is a 2-signature code with |C| = 8. Let
C =
[
c1 . . . c8
]
=
c11 · · · c81... . . . ...
c14 · · · c84
 . (15)
By Lemma 2.1, it is easy to check that (15) is still a 2-signature code by exchanging any two rows or any two
columns. Moreover, {x1, . . . ,x8} is also a 2-signature code where xi = (xi1, xi2, xi3, xi4) and xij = 1 − cij for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ 8 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 4.
First we divide C into groups with respect to the first and second rows of (15). Let
C0 = {ci ∈ C : ci1 = 0}, C1 = {c ∈ C : ci1 = 1},
T0 = {ci ∈ C0 : ci2 = 0}, T1 = {ci ∈ C0 : ci2 = 1},
Y0 = {ci ∈ C1 : ci2 = 0}, Y1 = {c ∈ C1 : ci2 = 1},
{a1,a2,a3,a4} = {0, 1}
2, I = {2, 3, 4} and I ′ = {3, 4}.
If |C0| ≥ 6, then C0|I is a 2-signature code of length 3 and |C0|I | = |C0| ≥ 6, which contradicts Corollary 2.6 that
A(3, 2) = 5. Thus, |C0| ≤ 5. Similarly, we also have |C1| ≤ 5. Since C = C0 ∪ C1 and |C| = 8, we only need to
discuss the following two cases.
1) |C0| = 3 and |C1| = 5. Then, |Y0|+ |Y1| = 5 and |T0|+ |T1| = 3. By Corollary 2.6 that A(2, 2) = 3, we have
|Y0| ≤ 3 and |Y1| ≤ 3. There are two subcases.
1.1) |Y0| = 2 and |Y1| = 3. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
C =

1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
 .
1.1.a) If |T0| = 3, then |T0|I′ | = 3. Since |Y1|I′ | = 3 and Y1|I′ , T0|I′ ⊆ {0, 1}2, we have |Y1|I′ ∩ T0|I′ | ≥ 2.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that
C =
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 00 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ a1 a2 a1 a2 ∗
 .
Then c4 + c7 = c5 + c6, a contradiction to Lemma 2.1.
1.1.b) If |T0| = 2, we may assume that
C =

1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
 .
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By Lemma 2.1 and the fact that |{0, 1}2| = 4, we must have |T0|I′ ∩Y0|I′ | ≤ 1, |T0|I′ ∩Y1|I′ | = 1 and
|Y0|I′ ∩ Y1|I′ | = 1. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
C =
 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 00 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
a1 a2 a1 a3 a4 a2 a3 ∗
 .
Then for any choice of T1|I′ = {aj}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, we could have a contradiction to Lemma 2.1.
1.1.c) If |T0| = 1, we may assume that
C =

1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
 .
Similarly, we have |T1|I′ ∩ Y0|I′ | ≤ 1, |T1|I′ ∩ Y1|I′ | = 1 and |Y0|I′ ∩ Y1|I′ | = 1. Without loss of
generality, we may assume that
C =
 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 00 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
a1 a2 a1 a3 a4 ∗ a2 a3
 .
If T0|I′ = {aj}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then in a similar manner as the case 1.1.b), we could obtain contradictions
to Lemma 2.1. If T0|I′ = {a4}, since C is a 2-signature code, we must have
c1 + c7 6= c4 + c6, c2 + c8 6= c3 + c6, and c3 + c8 6= c5 + c7,
which implies that
a1 + a2 6= a3 + a4, a2 + a3 6= a1 + a4, and a1 + a3 6= a4 + a2. (16)
Since {a1,a2,a3,a4} = {0, 1}2, (16) cannot be achieved, a contradiction to the assumption.
1.1.d) If |T0| = 0, a similar discussion with the case 1.1.a) will lead to a contradiction.
1.2) |Y0| = 3 and |Y1| = 2. We can discuss in the same way with the case 1.1) and then also get contradictions.
2) |C0| = |C1| = 4. Then, |Y0| + |Y1| = 4 and |T0| + |T1| = 4. We only need to consider the case that
|Y0| = |Y1| = 2 and |T0| = |T1| = 2. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
C =

1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
 .
By Lemma 2.1, we have |Y1|I′ ∩ Y0|I′ | ≤ 1. Then we discuss the following two subcases.
2.1) Y1|I′ ∩ Y0|I′ = ∅. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
C =
 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 01 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
a1 a2 a3 a4 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
 .
By Lemma 2.1, we must have |T0|I′ ∩ T1|I′ | ≤ 1 and |Ti|I′ ∩ Yj |I′ | ≤ 1 for i 6= j ∈ {0, 1}. By discussing
the possible choices of T1|I′ , that is, {a1,a3}, {a1,a4}, {a2,a3} or {a2,a4}, we could get contradictions
to Lemma 2.1 from T0|I′ .
2.2) |Y1|I′ ∩ Y0|I′ | = 1. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
C =
 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 01 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
a1 a2 a1 a3 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
 .
A similar discussion with the case 2.1) will lead to contradictions.
Then we have A(4, 2) ≤ 7.
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